Recent revisions of cognitive dissonance theory no longer encompass some of the important examples, data, and hypotheses that were part of Festinger's original statement. Further, the psychological character of the motivation for cognitive change can be interpreted, in recent statements of the theory, as a need to preserve self-esteem rather than a need to maintain logic-like consistency among cognitions. These changes are so substantial as to prompt the observation that the evolved theory might be identified as a different theory-in fact, as one that predates cognitive dissonance theory. A final, disturbing thought: What if the original dissonance theory, which has now surrendered its name to somewhat different ideas, was correct?
Since the original statement by Festinger in 1957, there have been periodic major restatements of cognitive dissonance theory (Aronson, 1968; Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) . Each of the restatements of dissonance theory has described a major constriction of Festinger's (1957) original premise t h a t dissonance is a motivational state aroused by the juxtaposition of two cognitive elements, x and y, when "not-x follows from y" (p. 13). Brehm and Cohen (1962) noted t h a t inconsistency had strong ~notivational properties only when a n individual was bound by a behavioral commitment t o one of the inconsistent cognitions. In Aronson's (1968) statement, dissonance was hypothesized t o be a significant motivational force only when the self-concept or some other firmly held expectancy was involved. In the most recent statement, Wicklund and Brehm (1976) have incorporated and refined the two earlier revisions in terms of the concept of personal responsibility: "Recent research .
has made it abundantly clear t h a t dissonance reduction a s we know it takes place only when the dissonant elements have been brought together through the personal responsibility of the individual who experiences dissonance" (P. 7).
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Observations on the Evolution of
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Wicklund and Brehm (1976) commented on the 20-year history of dissonance theory by observing, "To the extent t h a t dissonance theory has evolved since 1957, the evolution has been primarily due t o the discovery t h a t responsibility is a prerequisite for effects t h a t we call dissonance reduction" (p. 71). While this may seem a modest change, the reader who peruses the original statement of the theory (Festinger, 1957) will discover the following substantial changes :
1. Several of the original defining illustrations of cognitive dissonance are not gncompassed by the contemporary definition. Among these are:
If a person believed t h a t man will reach the moon in the near future and also believed t h a t man will not be able t o build a device t h a t can leave the atmosphere of the earth, these two cognitions are dissonant with one another. (Festinger, 1957, p. 14) If a person were standing in the rain and yet could see no evidence that he was getting wet, these two cognitions would be dissonant with one another. (Festinger, 1957, p. 14) I n the present version of the theory, neither of these situations is expected t o arouse dissonance because they have no apparent element of personal responsibility. First, Festinger (1957, pp. 158-162 ) cited a n experiment by Ewing (1942) in support of a dissonance prediction about effects of unexpected exposure t o a disagreeable communication. Ewing found t h a t the communication produced greater attitude change among audience members who had been led not t o expect t h a t the communication would disagree with their prior opinions than among audience members who were led (properly) t o expect the communication t o disagree. In the present version of dissonance theory, since Ewing's audience members should not have felt responsible for their exposure t o the unexpected disagreeing information, there should be no expectation t h a t this condition would enhance dissonance reduction via opinion change.
Second, Festinger (1957, pp. 236-239 ) noted t h a t there should be dissonance arising from t h e experience of being in a massive earthquake without experiencing personal injury or other damages. H e cited support for this analysis in a study of rumors t h a t occurred following a major earthquake in India in 1934. T h e rumors, which "predicted terrible disasters t o come" (p. 238), were seen by Festinger a s serving t o reduce dissonance. Because, however, t h e local inhibitants should not have felt personally responsible for their experience of "living in the area which received the shock of the earthquake but which did not suffer any damage" (p. 237), this evidence is not pertinent to the present version of dissonance theory. Festinger's (1957) original "basic hypotheses" (p. 3) has had suficient disconfirmation to have been, in efect, dropped from the theory. T h e hypothesis was "When dissonance is present, in addition t o trying t o reduce it, t h e person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance" (p. 3). Wicklund and Brehm (1976) have concluded t h a t "it is difficult t o obtain evidence for selective avoidance of 'dissonance-arousing' information" (p. 189).
One of

T h e psychological characteristics of the motivation for dissonance reduction have changed.
In the original theory, dissonance was a state of discomfort associated with any inconsistency between relevant cognitions. The psychological essence of the motivational state was something akin t o logical inconsistency a s indicated by the words "follow from" in the definition (Festinger, 1957, p. 13) : "Two elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the other." In contrast, the motivational force in present versions of dissonance theory has much more of a n ego-defensive character.
As noted earlier, self-concept cognitions were first made important in dissonance theory in Aronson's (1968) analysis. Wicklund and Brehm (1976) would appear t o have steered away from Aronson's appeal t o self-concept. However, their assumption t h a t dissonance is aroused only when a person is responsible for producing some undesired consequence makes i t difficult t o distinguish their conception of dissonance reduction from one of ego defense.' This point may be illustrated by observing t h a t contemporary dissonance theorists analyze the counterattitudinal roleplaying experiment a s involving dissonance between the cognitive elements A ( I believe X, where X is the initial opinion) and B ( I agreed to advocate not-X). Taken by itself, this AB pair of cognitions has a n obvious property of logic-like inconsistency. However, because responsibility for undesired consequences is also assumed t o be present when dissonance is aroused, i t becomes possible t o hypothesize ' Wicklund and Brehm (1976) did not, in fact, assert that a person must be responsible for producing an undesired consequence in order to experience dissonance (see their exact statement about responsibility quoted in the first paragraph of this article). However, a more recent statement by Brehrn (Note 1) has made this explicit: "A dissonance reduction effect is obtained when a person brings about a consequence that he would (in theabsenceof other forces) avoid as long as he knew that the consequence would or could happen." Some other currently active dissonance researchers, Mark Zanna and Joel Cooper, similarly have stated that the condition necessary for dissonance arousal is "responsibility for aversive consequences" (Cooper, Note 2). The responsibility-for-undesired-consequences definition of dissonance is a product of two decades of research on counterattitudinal role playing, originating in experiments by Kelman (1953) and Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and culminating in publications by Calder, Ross, and Insko (1973) and Collins and Hoyt (1972) . In both of the latter articles, responsibility for undesired consequences was pinpointed as a condition that maximized attitude change in the direction of counterattitudinal role playing. t h a t the pair of cognitions t h a t produces tension toward cognitive change is not the AB pair just described, but rather a somewhat different pair, t h a t is, C ( I caused [undesired] consequence Y ) and a self-concept cognition,
D ( I a m a good [or intelligent] person who does not do such evil [or stupid] things).
I n this fashion, it is possible t o argue t h a t the motivation for cognitive change in contemporary versions of dissonance theory is indistinguishable from ego defense.
Dissonance Theory and Self Theory: Convergent Evolution
Cognitive dissonance theory has shown a history of adapting its theoretical statement t o be consistent with t h e body of empirical d a t a it has spawned. Interestingly, the behavior of the theorists doing t h e revising is a nearperfect illustration of dissonance reduction of the sort intended in the original statement of the theory but excluded by the present version. ( I t is excluded in the present version because those doing the revising were often not personally responsible either for the earlier versions or for the d a t a t h a t suggested their revisions.)
T h e continuing process of adjusting a theoretical statement to maintain its currencv with empirical d a t a is scientifically questionable. Revision, as opposed to rejection, of a theory is acceptable only so long a s basic characteristics of the theory remain intact. In the case of dissonance theory, the emerging centrality of the notion of personal responsibility for undesired consequences does appear t o have changed the basic character of the theory. T h e theory seems now t o be focused on cognitive changes occurring in the service of ego defense, or self-esteem maintenance, rather than in the interest of preserving psychological consistency. Indeed, contemporary dissonance theory bears a striking resemblance t o theoretical statements about ego-related cognitive processes t h a t existed well before Festinger's (1957) statement. For example, When a person reacts in a neutral, impersonal, routine atmosphere, his behavior is one thing. But when he is behaving personally, perhaps excitedly, seriously committed to a task, he behaves quite differently. I n the first condition his ego is not engaged; in the second condition it is. . . . We have seen t h a t under conditions of ego-involvement the whole personality manifests greater consistency in behavior, reveals not specificity in conduct b u t generality and congruence. (Allport, 1943, pp. 459, 472, italics added) If self-deception either by denial or by disguise is accepted a s characteristic of a [defense] mechanism, the problem still remains as t o the source of or reasons for the self-deception. T h e obvious interpretation is t h a t the need for self-deception arises because of a more fundamental need t o maintain or t o restore self-esteem. Anything belittling t o the self is t o be avoided. (Hilgard, 1949, p. 374) As experiences occur in the life of the individual, they are either (a) symbolized, perceived and organized into some relationship t o the self, (b) ignored because there is no perceived relationship t o the self-structure, (c) denied symbolization or given a distorted symbolization because the experience i s inconsistent with the structure of the self. (Rogers, 1951, p. 503, italics added) I t seems nearly as difficult t o accept a perception which would alter the selfconcept in a n expanding or socially acceptable direction as t o accept a n experience which would alter i t in a constricting or socially disapproved direction. (Rogers, 1951, p. 506) While the above statements are harmonious with contemporary versions of dissonance theory and its associated body of empirical data, they have little direct pertinence t o the original version. Dissonance theory has evolved, in other words, in the direction of convergence with a body of theory t h a t predated it.
T h e passages quoted above from Allport (1943) and Hilgard (1949) were from addresses in which each forecast a shift in psychological theory t o a focus on self or ego. This predicted focus on self was apparent in clinical psychology and personality theory in t h e 1940s and 1950s, as exemplified in the influential nature of the work of Allport, Goldstein, Maslow, Snygg and Combs, and Rogers. Social psychologists, on the other hand (and after a long delay relative t o the prediction), appear t o have backed into a focus on self. This emerging trend in social psychology is apparent not only in the evolution of cognitive dissonance theory but in other developments such as (a) the interest in differences in inference (attribution) processes for self-relevant versus otherrelevant information (this is referred to as the actor-observer distinction by attribution theorists, e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1971) , (b) theoretical interpretation of the consequences of perceptual focus on t h e self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Scheier & Carver, 1977) , a n d (c) t h e incipient development of a body of data in which "self" is demonstrated t o be an organizing principle in human information processing (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Markus, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) .
Final Observation : S t a t u s of the Original Dissonance Theory
There have been many good consequences of t h e 20-year history of dissonance theory. If the present authors are correct in assuming t h a t the 20-vear evolution signals a birth of social psychological interest in the construct of "self," this convergence with self theory should not be regarded as a step backward. Rather, t h e many studies inspired by dissonance theory assure t h a t t h e new focus on self will proceed from a strong foundation of relevant empirical findings.
Perhaps t h e only victim of the evolutionary process is t h e original version of dissonance theory, which has effectively been discarded. B u t has i t ever really been proven wrong?
Consider t h e possibility t h a t dissonance researchers abandoned portions of the original theory because their experiments inadvertently tapped self-protective cognitive processing instead of, or in addition to, dissonance reduction. T h e ego-related cognitive processes, being relatively easy t o observe, may have pulled the theory in their direction. Had effort been directed instead a t achieving more precise methods of testing t h e original dissonance formulation, perhaps more support for i t would have been obtained. Possiblv. dis-< , sonance-reduction effects in t h e original sense exist b u t are weaker t h a n the self-esteemmaintaining effects t h a t have been observed. For this reason, t h e experiments needed t o observe effects predicted by t h e original dissonance theory must be carefully designed t o avoid confounding with self-esteem processes and must also be powerful enough t o detect relatively small effects. Are these experiments still worth doing?
Postscript: A n A p p r e c i a t i o n of Dissonance T h e o r y
T h e authors, along with many others, believe t h a t dissonance theory has been a n extremely stimulating force within and beyond social psychology. T h e enigmas posed by t h e original statement of dissonance theory and later, by the juxtaposition of t h a t statement with research results. have motivated research t h a t has advanced greatly the understanding of human cognition. W e have observed t h a t , in t h e course of these 20 years of empirical and theoretical advance. dissonance theorv has evolved in a directio; of convergence w i t i ideas from t h e tradition of self theory. A t the time of this writing, dissonance theory is still actively inspiring novel empirical findings and evolving further theoretically (e.g., Cooper, Note 3 ; Zanna, Note 4), perhaps t o a point a t which the present observations about congruence with self theory may soon be outdated. T h e pace of theoretical evolution indicates the sustained vigor of the dissonance theory tradition. A t t h e same time, this rapid evolutionary pace entails a risk t h a t some ideas will be accepted or abandoned without adequate empirical scrutiny.
